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Essay by Allen C. Guelzo
Defending Reconstruction
There are no reconstruction re-enactors. And who would want to be? Reconstruction is the disappointing 
epilogue to the American Civil War, a sort 
of Grimm fairy tale stepchild of the war and 
the ugly duckling of American history. Even 
Abraham Lincoln was uneasy at using the 
word “reconstruction”—he qualified it with 
add-ons like “what is called reconstruction” or 
“a plan of reconstruction (as the phrase goes)”—
and preferred to speak of the “re-inauguration 
of the national authority” or the need to “re-
inaugurate loyal state governments.” Unlike 
the drama of the war years, Reconstruction 
has no official starting or ending date. Al-
though we usually bookend the period with 
the Confederate surrender in 1865 and the 
withdrawal of federal occupation troops in 
1877, people had been talking about “recon-
struction” even before the shooting began in 
1861, and the federal occupation troops who 
were withdrawn in 1877 were by that time lit-
tle more than a corporal’s guard. In some sense, 
Reconstruction ended when Democrats man-
aged to regain control of the House of Repre-
sentatives in 1874; other parts of it spluttered 
on till the appearance of Jim Crow in the 1890s 
and Plessy v. Ferguson in 1896. 
Even more difficult than sticking dates on it, 
Reconstruction is difficult to grade. The best 
that has been said for it was that it was “unfin-
ished”; the worst that it was a “mistake.” Yet, 
in its most fundamental sense, Reconstruc-
tion was actually a surprising success. The 
secessionist regimes in the Southern states 
were deposed, new federally-supervised gov-
ernments were put in their place, and one-
by-one the rebel states were restored to the 
Union—which is to say, they sent representa-
tives and senators to Congress, acknowledged 
federal laws passed by Congress, and obeyed 
the federal military and civilian institutions 
which implemented them. Military occupa-
tion, marvelled the North American Review in 
1872, was managed with a mild hand, deploy-
ing “out of the reduced army of thirty thou-
sand men” that remained after postwar demo-
bilization in 1865 “only one-tenth for service at 
the South.” As Walt Whitman wrote, almost 
in self-congratulation, Reconstruction “has 
been paralleled nowhere in the world—in any 
other country on the globe the whole batch of 
the Confederate leaders would have had their 
heads cut off.” (Ironically, most of the violence 
that pockmarked Reconstruction was inflict-
ed on the victors, not the vanquished.) 
Take it a step further: if the point of 
the Civil War was to reestablish a federal 
Union—a genuinely federal Union in which 
neither the states nor the federal government 
claimed exclusive sovereignty, but shared 
it in a federal system—then Reconstruc-
tion should be as much a source of national 
self-admiration as the Civil War long has 
been. The next half-century proved to be the 
Golden Age of constitutional state rights, 
with states taking up the political initiative 
in terms of civic reform, women’s rights, and 
public education long before the federal gov-
ernment ever noticed them.
But that, of course, is not the way Recon-
struction has been taught to most of us. For 
decades, both the hell-no partisans of the Lost 
Cause and turn-of-the-century Southern Pro-
gressives maintained that Reconstruction was 
a nightmare inflicted on them by a psychoti-
cally vengeful coterie of Radical Republicans 
in Congress led by Thaddeus Stevens, Charles 
Sumner, and Ben Wade. This view depicts 
Reconstruction as a kind of Vichy occupa-
tion, partly a draconian direct rule by schem-
ing, unscrupulous Northern interlopers 
called “carpetbaggers,” and partly an unstable 
domination by Southern turncoats known as 
“scalawags.” In the work of the then-reigning 
prince of Reconstruction historians, William 
A. Dunning, Reconstruction was only tempo-
rarily successful, and for all the wrong reasons. 
It demonstrated the excesses of democracy, 
especially in giving the vote to freed slaves, 
and produced what Progressives regarded as 
the mortal sins of unmanaged government—
inefficiency and corruption. 
The Dunning School hit its first major op-
position in the 1930s, beginning with the at-
tacks launched by W.E.B. Du Bois in Black 
Reconstruction in America (1935) and James 
S. Allen (the nom-de-plume of Sol Auerbach) 
in Reconstruction: The Battle for Democ-
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(1965) started the supplanting, followed by 
John and LaWanda Cox, Richard Current, 
Allen W. Trelease, and finally by Eric Foner’s 
massive Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished 
Revolution, 1863–1877 (1988). 
Competing Economies
Noble as their intentions were, the anti-Dunningites had their faults, too. Du Bois, Allen, Stampp, 
and Foner were writing from self-consciously 
Marxist frameworks that forbade any other 
understanding of Reconstruction but through 
class and revolution, with race sometimes de-
ployed as a surrogate for class. Reconstruction 
thus became the moment when working-class 
blacks and whites together had an opportuni-
ty to create a new economic and political order 
in the South. They had been encouraged in 
this alliance by the so-called bourgeoisie, who 
saw this rising proletariat as a useful ally in 
their war against the feudal aristocracy. Alas, 
as the Marxists saw it, bourgeois revolutions 
frighten their own architects, since the bour-
geoisie are themselves the owners of prop-
erty—in this case, industrial property—and 
quickly come to see that in empowering peas-
ants and workers, they have created a Fran-
kenstein monster that has no more respect for 
the bourgeoisie than it had for the aristocrats. 
At that moment of self-realization, the bour-
geoisie strain to stuff the revolutionary genie 
back into the lamp from which it was conjured. 
“The bourgeoisie,” wrote Lenin, “strives to put 
an end to the bourgeois revolution halfway 
from its destination, when freedom has been 
only half won, by a deal with the old authori-
ties and the landlords.” But the genie cannot 
be stuffed; it is only stunned, and in time it 
will reawaken with renewed strength as the 
guide and leader of the socialist revolution, 
and finish-off industrial capitalism the way 
the bourgeoisie overthrew the aristocrats. Du 
Bois in particular bears the impress of this no-
tion of Reconstruction as a bourgeois revolu-
tion, for in Du Bois’s telling, Reconstruction’s 
“vision of democracy across racial lines” was 
undone by a “counterrevolution of property.” 
There are, however, two significant hurdles 
to accepting this definition of Reconstruction 
as a conventional “bourgeois revolution.” As 
historians like James Huston, David Mont-
gomery, and Robert Gordon have shown, the 
contest which was waged between 1861 and 
1865 was not between a Southern mint-julep-
sipping aristocracy and a smoke-belching fac-
tory capitalism, but between two versions of 
agrarianism, between the free-labor family 
farm and the slave-labor cotton plantation. 
racy (1937). The Dunning School, Du Bois 
protested, had succeeded in making every 
“child in the street” believe that “the history 
of the United States from 1866 to 1876 is 
something of which the nation ought to be 
ashamed.” Reconstruction might not have 
been a proud achievement, but Reconstruc-
tion actually set an example “to democratic 
government and the labor movement today.” 
Allen agreed: “The destruction of the slave 
power was the basis for real national unity 
and the further development of capitalism, 
which would produce conditions most favor-
able for the growth of the labor movement.” 
The Dunningites thought that radical Re-
construction was something to be deplored, 
and cheered when it failed; the revisionists 
agreed that it failed, but wept. Southern 
blacks, in Du Bois’s phrase, “went free; stood 
a brief moment in the sun; then moved back 
into slavery.” 
Unhappily, neither Du Bois nor Allen pos-
sessed a broad platform on which to rally a 
counter-movement. It would not be until the 
1960s, after the emergence of the civil rights 
movement as a “second Reconstruction,” that 
the idols of the Dunning School really be-
gan to fall. John Hope Franklin’s Reconstruc-
tion After the Civil War (1961) and Kenneth 
Stampp’s The Era of Reconstruction, 1865-77 
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Only in Rhode Island did workers in Ameri-
can factories amount to more than 20% of the 
population (although Massachusetts was a 
close second); in the West, the numbers rarely 
topped 1%. Not until the 20th century would 
the United States begin to emerge as a genu-
ine industrial power, and with it, an economy 
which could be clearly demarcated by class 
conflict.
But a greater problem with the Marxist 
construct of a bourgeois revolution is that 
there is no evidence whatsoever that the revo-
lutionaries who essayed to build a bourgeois 
South ever panicked at the prospect of em-
powering blacks or poor whites, or betrayed 
them by establishing a self-protecting alliance 
with the aristocrats. To the contrary, Recon-
struction was a bourgeois revolution that was 
crushed by the resurgent political power of a 
bloodied but unbowed aristocracy, establish-
ing alliances of its own with the emerging in-
dustrial proletariat of the postwar North. 
Free Labor
The goal of abolishing slavery was often not, as we are tempted to see it, a crusade to right a racial injustice; for 
many Republicans abolishing slavery was not 
much of a racial question at all, but rather an 
economic one. The Union “represents the prin-
ciples of free labor,” declared New York Evening 
Post editor William Cullen Bryant, and only 
when “the victory of the Northern society of 
free labor over the landed monopoly of the 
Southern aristocracy” was complete would the 
war be over. In the most basic sense, free labor 
was simply a shorthand for liberal economic 
democracy. Among free labor’s fundamental 
tenets were the encouragement of small-scale 
manufacturing, especially through govern-
ment-sponsored “internal improvements” in 
the form of canals, highways, and railroads; 
economic mobility, with constant movement 
up the ladder of classes; and the practice of a 
constellation of bourgeois virtues—thrift, pru-
dence, industry, religious faith, temperance, ra-
tionality, nationalism—which would all tend 
together to dignify what the New York Ameri-
can described in 1834 as both “the enterprising 
mechanic, who raises himself by his ingenious 
labors from the dust and turmoil of his work-
shop, to an abode of ease and elegance” and 
“the industrious tradesman, whose patient fru-
gality enables him at last to accumulate enough 
to forego the duties of the counter and indulge 
a well-earned leisure.”
In the eyes of the free-labor middle class, 
the mistake of the South had been to allow the 
thousand-bale planters to turn the Enlighten-
ment clock backwards to medieval serfdom. 
“Who knows,” asked the New-York Daily Tri-
bune, “but we may see revived [in the South] 
the feudal tenures—maiden-right, wardship, 
baronial robberies, the seizure of white chil-
dren for the market, military service, and the 
horrible hardships of villenage which men 
have fondly deemed forever abolished” as the 
logical corollaries of slavery. In the South, the 
ruling class of “monarchists and aristocrats” 
had shunned government-sponsored improve-
ments, cultivated a style based on braggadocio, 
and held poor whites and black slaves in the 
grip of a permanent and oppressive hierarchy. 
“There labor has been degraded, the laborer left 
untaught,” warned the Chicago Tribune in 1864, 
“thus converting half the Union into a charnel 
house of despotism, without a free religion, 
free speech, free press or free schools.” The 
Civil War, however, had swept this “despotism” 
away, and cleared the path for introducing into 
the South what Republican Congressman 
James Campbell called a New England-style 
“high type” of culture: “the cultivated valley, the 
peaceful village, the church, the school-house, 
his spine. He opened a law office and became 
president of a small wood-handle business, the 
Snow Turning Company, whose success left 
him “perfectly thunderstruck at the profits” as 
well as the good wages paid to its largely black 
workforce. John Hay, who had been Lincoln’s 
private secretary, was another example. Hay 
had been sent in 1864 to register Southern-
ers willing to take the oath of allegiance, and 
came away sufficiently intrigued by Florida (“It 
is the only thing that smells of the Original 
Eden on the Continent”) that he bought land 
to grow oranges near St. Augustine. Even Har-
riet Beecher Stowe, the author of Uncle Tom’s 
Cabin, bought orange groves near Jacksonville, 
moved South, and created a free-labor colony 
around the village of Mandarin. “People came 
hither from the North,” wrote a New Orleans 
contributor to DeBow’s Review, “with the idea 
that they were coming to an El Dorado, where 
fortunes were to be gained in a day.” 
Here was a real bourgeois revolution—not 
in the Marxist sense of being a necessary foot-
stool to the “real” proletarian revolution—but 
an Enlightenment counter-revolution against 
what the Northern middle classes feared 
might be the real wave of the future: the Ro-
mantic renascence of oligarchy and monarchy. 
Lost Cause
The principal obstacle to realizing this dream was the refusal of the de-feated Southern planter class to admit 
that it had been defeated, for that class had by 
no means been swept away by the war. They, 
too, had lived by a set of presuppositions, but 
one based on a general suspicion of middle 
class ambitions. “The typical Southerner,” 
feared a contributor to the Atlantic Monthly, 
“possessed a…cast of character which was 
founded mainly on family, distinction, social 
culture, exemption from toil, and command 
over the lives and fortunes of his underlings.” 
Not only the culture of the South, but its 
physical circumstances, too, helped sustain its 
recalcitrant feudalism. The South owned only 
12% of the nation’s mills and factories, and 
employed as laborers in those establishments 
only 7% of its population. Cotton agriculture 
remained after 1865, as it had been before the 
war, the producer of the United States’s single 
most valuable export commodity (some 32% 
of all exports as late as 1889). And no wonder: 
while commodity prices for wheat, corn, and 
coal had operated (except for the war years) 
within fairly narrow ranges, cotton was selling 
above all its pre-war highs; in Georgia, Ala-
bama, Mississippi, and Arkansas cotton acre-
age and production expanded, employing a 
black labor force indistinguishable from that 
and thronging cities.” The South “under the 
old system” was adverse to “manufacturing and 
commercial enterprises.”
But now, the “tide of free labor” which would 
rush into the conquered Confederacy “will be 
incalculable.” The South’s “worn-out planta-
tions will become thriving farms,” rejoiced the 
Continental Monthly in 1862, “its mines and 
inexhaustible water-powers will call into play 
the incessant demand and supply of vigorous 
industry and active capital.” Reconstruction of-
fered a means of refashioning the entire labor 
system of the South, provided, wrote Union 
veteran Albion Tourgée, that the South was 
“desouthernized and thoroughly nationalized.” 
Tourgée was an example of how eager North-
erners were to help this process along. Born 
in Ohio and educated in New York, he had 
served in the 105th Ohio, endured the suffer-
ings of Libby Prison as a prisoner-of-war, and 
settled in Greensboro, North Carolina, at 
the end of the war in order to find relief in a 
warmer climate for a wound that had damaged 
Reconstruction
was a bourgeois
revolution that was
crushed by the resurgent 
political power of a
bloodied but unbowed 
aristocracy.
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under slavery. Great Britain in the decade 
after the Civil War still bought 58% of the 
cotton it imported for textile manufacturing 
from the United States, and that would con-
tinue to rise through 1876. 
Despite the economic impoverishment im-
posed on the South by the war and the legal ab-
olition of slavery, the patterns of economic pro-
duction remained remarkably unchanged. In 
western Alabama’s “black belt,” 236 landown-
ers possessed at least $10,000 in real estate in 
1860 (with the median landholding amounting 
to 1600 acres); 101 of those landowners were 
still in possession in 1870—which was about 
the same rate of persistence over time which 
had prevailed before the war. And it was notice-
able that, outside the principal cities, the great 
marker of a free economy—the use of cash as 
a medium of exchange—entered only fitfully 
into Southern calculations. The New York 
Cash Store in Greenville, Alabama, advertised 
(despite its name) that “we will take in exchange 
for goods, country produce, particularly Eggs, 
Chickens, Bees Wax, Dry Hides, Peas, Corn 
Meal, and anything else that we can dispose of.” 
Former slaveholders, thanks in large mea-
sure to President Andrew Johnson’s amnesties 
and the failure to break up or even confiscate 
rebel land-holdings, were thus free to use cot-
ton profits to maintain a version of the planta-
tion system, closing off opportunities for the 
newly freed slaves to acquire land and forcing 
them into peonage. “The relation of master 
and slave no longer exists here,” wrote one 
Mississippi valley planter, “but out of it has 
evolved that of patron and retainer,” which 
was a far cry from “one purely of business” or 
“the ordinary relation of landlord and tenant 
or of employer and employee.” Slavery might 
have been legally dead, but it was only being 
replaced by hutted serfdom.
Northern free-labor apostles grew dis-
couraged at the poor inroads they had made 
on Southern culture, and went home, disil-
lusioned. They were, sighed Charles Gayarré 
in the North American Review in 1877, only 
“merchants, shopkeepers, mechanics, manu-
facturers, speculators, brokers, bankers” and 
not “barons after the fashion of the South.” 
They were subject to harrassment, shunning 
and violence, and stigmatized as “carpetbag-
gers.” Leander Bigger, an Ohioan who moved 
to South Carolina after service in the Union 
army, described the burning of a store he 
owned west of Manning, South Carolina, 
where the chief offense seemed to have been 
his willingness to extend credit to black farm-
ers trying to set up on their own: 
They ransacked the store…. All my dry 
goods—everything that was combus-
tible—they took out into the square, 
and took a keg of powder that I kept 
in a concealed place…piled the goods 
over it, and set the pile on fire. The 
goods, being calicoes, muslins, and de-
lains, burnt slowly. They carried us up 
to the fire, and the speaker (they gave all 
their orders by signals) ordered his men 
to mount. They mounted their horses, 
formed in line, and then the speaker 
came up to me and told me, “You must 
quit business. This is only a warning: 
the next time we will put you on the fire.” 
…He said he was from hell and repre-
sented the devil; that he would take me 
with him if I did not obey orders. 
And no wonder: Southern elites saw little 
in the free-labor ideology they wanted to em-
brace. Northerners remained as “effeminate, 
selfish, most unscrupulously grasping” as ever, 
declared the Southern novelist Augusta Jane 
Evans in 1867; even their children were “piti-
able manikins already chanting praises to the 
Gold Calf.” 
Jim Crow was an anti-free-labor strategy 
as much as it was a strategy of political ex-
clusion. The freedman “is going to be made 
a serf, sure as you live,” prophesied one white 
Alabamian to John Townsend Trowbridge in 
1865. “It won’t need any law for that.” When 
it was pointed out that South Carolina’s “eight 
box law” (requiring a voter to be able to read 
the names of candidates and the respective of-
fices they were running-for in order to place 
the correct ballot in one of eight ballot boxes) 
would disfranchise poor whites as easily as 
blacks, the major-general of the South Caro-
lina militia merely replied, “We care not if it 
does.” South Carolina Republicans protested 
that this had no other purpose than “keeping 
the middle classes and the poor whites, to-
gether with the negroes, from having anything 
to do with the elections,” and they were right. 
Seeing the Future
Reconstruction aspired to restore the foundations of freedom to a way-ward South and it expected to triumph 
as effortlessly as 19th-century liberal notions 
of progress had promised. Instead, the same 
Romantic feudalism that had created the old 
Southern order reasserted its hegemony, and 
postwar Southern aristocrats appealed to a set 
of cultural and racial biases which safely de-
fused the importance of property, and sharply 
restricted access to it. This might have been 
averted had the victorious Union been will-
ing to pour the resources into Reconstruction 
it had devoted to winning the war. But Re-
construction became a symbol of how quickly 
political fatigue afflicts liberal democracies. 
Moreover, understanding Reconstruction as a 
bourgeois revolution which was strangled in its 
cradle by vengeful cotton nabobs offers some 
larger parallels to the optimistic era that pre-
vailed between the fall of the Berlin Wall and 
the rise of Islamic state terrorism. 
In his 1989 essay for the National Interest, 
“The End of History?” political scientist Fran-
cis Fukuyama seized on the ignominious col-
lapse of the Soviet system as proof that “the 
end point of mankind’s ideological evolution” 
was “the universalization of Western liberal 
democracy as the final form of human govern-
ment” and Marxism’s “death as a living ideol-
ogy of world historical significance.” That con-
clusion was, to say the least, premature, not 
only because it reckoned without the rise of 
an Islamist theocracy or the fallout from the 
2008 worldwide recession, which provoked a 
renascence of Marxist advocacy in the writ-
ings of Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, 
Alain Badiou, the Occupy Movement, and 
Thomas Picketty. This pattern is, again, an 
echo of what happened in Reconstruction, 
and it warns those who yet believe that lib-
eral democracy is the most desirable political 
future to be wary of Whiggish assumptions 
about democracy’s inevitability. Human soci-
ety has oscillated between desires for stability, 
security, and reciprocity—which is what feu-
dalism, Marxism, and theocracy promise—
and desires for mobility, liberty, and profit—
which is what the Enlightenment offered on 
a world-historical scale. There is nothing that 
can be declared permanent in a bourgeois rev-
olution, and our own Reconstruction, not to 
mention a good deal of recent history, is the 
unhappy proof.
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